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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ROBERT T. HASTON, 
Appellant/Petitioner, 
Case No. 900021-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 3 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Petitioner Robert T. Haston files this petition for 
rehearing. In Cumminqs v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912), 
the Utah Supreme Court noted the appropriate standard for filing a 
petition: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of 
right, and we have no desire to discourage the 
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in proper 
cases. When this court, however, has considered and 
decided all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, unless we 
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or 
decision which may affect the result, or that we have 
based the decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result . . . If there are some 
reasons, however, such as we have indicated above, or 
other good reasons, a petition for a rehearing should 
be promptly filed and, if it is meritorious, its form 
will in no case be scrutinized by this court. 
129 P. at 624. This petition for rehearing meets the preceding 
standards and should be granted for the substantive reasons 
discussed below. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 6, 1991, this Court affirmed the trial court's 
conviction of Defendant/Appellant/Petitioner Robert T. Haston for 
Attempted Criminal Homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101, 76-4-102(2), and 76-5-203. The Court of 
Appeals decision is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this petition, no factual statements are 
necessary. This petition addresses only a question of law. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Attempted depraved indifference murder is not a crime 
because it requires that a defendant intend to commit an unintended 
killing. Finding it to be a logical impossibility, other 
jurisdictions have ruled that since such a "crime11 could not exist, 
the underlying conviction must be reversed. A similar disposition 
is required here. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
SINCE ATTEMPTED DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER IS A 
LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY, PETITIONERS CONVICTION 
SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
In State v. Johnson, 707 P.2d 1174 (N.M. App. 1985), the 
court raised, sua sponte, the question of whether a crime exists for 
attempted depraved mind murder. Holding that such a crime could not 
exist, the court reasoned: "in order to convict for attempted 
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depraved mind murder the jury would have to find defendant intended 
to perpetrate an unintentional killing." Id. at 1178. The court 
stressed the impossibility of this result and ultimately reversed 
the defendants convictions. 
As noted previously in Mr. Haston's letter of supplemental 
authority, this very issue is now before the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Vigil, Case No. 900166 (Utah to be argued orally June 11, 
1991) . See Addendum B; cjf. Appellant Haston's opening brief at 26 
n.9. Mr. Vigil and the State have both filed their respective 
briefs, with oral argument scheduled for June 11, 1991. Rather than 
resubmitting the issue and argument to this Court for a duplicative 
determination, Mr. Haston respectfully requests this Court to await 
the outcome of the Vigil decision before finalizing Mr. Haston's 
conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner Haston requests a rehearing by this Court on 
whether Attempted Criminal Homicide, as defined by the "depraved 
indifference" instruction, is a crime. In addition, Mr. Haston also 
requests a stay of the remittitur for his case. 
SUBMITTED this >^J day of May, 1991, 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATION 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, do hereby certify the following: 
(1) I am the attorney for Appellant/Petitioner in this case; 
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court 
in good faith and not to unnecessarily delay disposition of this 
matter. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this d~0 day of May, 1991. 
INALD S. 
£• 
RONA FUJBNO 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 23 6 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this J2£) day of May, 1991. 
Ronald S. Fujirio 
S.&T 
DELIVERED by this day 
of May, 1991. 
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ADDENDUM A 
MAY 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Robert T. Haston, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
61991 
' T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 900021-CA 
F I L E D 
(May 6, 1991) 
Third District/ Salt Lake County 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: Lisa J. Remal 
for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith 
Lake City, for Appellee 
and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake City, 
S. H. Atherton, Salt 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant Robert T. Haston appeals his conviction for 
attempted criminal homicide, a second degree felony. Defendant 
also challenges enhancement of his sentence for use of a 
firearm and imposition of fines, surcharge, costs, and 
restitution. We affirm his conviction but remand for 
resentencing. 
FACTS 
Defendant's companion, David Ezzeddine, had received his 
government assistance payment on August 2, 1989. The proceeds 
were used to defray the expenses incurred in the course of a 
protracted drinking party. Defendant, Ezzeddine, and Leonard 
Tate spent approximately two days engaged in nearly non-stop 
barhopping and imbibing, joined sporadically by three other 
companions. Over the course of this bacchanal, the revelers 
consumed a fifth-gallon of peppermint schnapps, several 
pitchers of beer, at least 120 cans of beer, and a quantity of 
vodka. 
On the afternoon of the second day, the festivities having 
moved to a motel on Salt Lake City's west side, Ezzeddine asked 
defendant to see his gun. Defendant gave Ezzeddine the gun, a 
revolver, which was then passed to Tate, and returned to 
defendant. Defendant offered a version of subsequent events 
which was at odds with the details related by Tate and 
Ezzeddine. Defendant claimed to have been loading the gun in 
order to be prepared to protect the group from possible 
burglars. In contrast, Tate and Ezzeddine claimed defendant 
was brandishing the gun while remonstrating Tate for the amount 
of beer he had permitted the others to consume. Tate claims 
that when he challenged defendant's bravado, defendant shot him. 
Defendant was tried by a jury and convicted of attempted 
criminal homicide, for which he was sentenced to a term of 
one-to-fifteen years. The court then enhanced the sentence 
with a mandatory one-year term and a discretionary zero-to-five 
year term for use of a firearm and ordered the sentences to be 
served consecutively. On appeal, defendant challenges the 
imposition of two additional prison terms as sentence 
enhancement, and contests the imposition of restitution, fine, 
surcharge, and costs in the form of attorney fees. Defendant 
also claims that jury instructions concerning the burden of 
proof were defective, misstating and inadequately explaining 
the law, and that the prosecution's misstatement of the law on 
the affirmative defense of intoxication was prejudicial. 
Finally, he claims the "depraved indifference" instruction was 
legally insufficient. 
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION 
Defendant challenges Instruction Number Seven as failing 
to adequately define the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and 
claims the instruction could have allowed the jury to convict 
on an improper civil standard of proof. We will reverse on the 
1. Instruction Number Seven read: 
All presumptions of law, independent 
of evidence, are in favor of innocence, 
and a defendant is presumed innocent until 
he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. And in case of a reasonable doubt 
as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily 
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal. 
900021-CA 2 
basis of an improper instruction only where the defendant 
demonstrates prejudice stemming from the instructions viewed in 
the aggregate. State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 
1980) . We review jury instructions in their entirety, State v. 
Binaham, 684 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1984), and will affirm H[w]hen 
taken as a whole . . . they fairly tender the case to the jury, 
[even where] one or more of the instructions, standing alone, 
are not as full or accurate as- they might have been . . . . * 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981). See also Cage 
v. Louisiana, 111 S.Ct. 328, 329 (1990) (HIn construing the 
instruction, we consider how reasonable jurors could have 
understood the charge as a whole."); State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 
1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) (jury instructions must be construed as 
a whole). 
Defendant relies heavily on Justice Stewart's concurring 
opinion in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1148 (Utah 1989), 
which was joined in by two other justices and thus is the 
opinion of the Court as concerns the reasonable doubt 
instruction challenged in that case. Justice Stewart's 
opinion, drawn largely from his dissenting opinion in State v. 
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 1989), analyzed specific 
language commonly featured in reasonable doubt instructions. 
(Footnote 1 continued) 
I have heretofore told you that the 
burden is upon the State to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. Now by a reasonable doubt is 
meant a doubt that is based on reason and 
one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt 
and not a doubt which is merely fanciful 
or imaginary or based on a wholly 
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof 
which satisfies the mind, convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to 
act conscientiously upon it and obviates 
all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt 
is a doubt which reasonable men and women 
would entertain, and it must arise from 
the evidence or the lack of evidence in 
this case. 
Two discrete criteria may be distilled from these opinions. 
First, as defendant notes, the instruction should contain 
terminology which unambiguously expresses the prosecution's 
burden to "obviate all reasonable doubt." Ireland, 773 P.2d at 
1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Johnson, 774 P.2d at 
1149 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). That precise 
language is contained in Instruction Number Seven. Second, use 
of the "weighty affairs of life" language is proscribed. See 
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1148 (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
result). Instruction Number Seven omits any reference to 
"weighty affairs." The instruction thus conforms with both 
prongs of the Johnson/Ireland directive. 
la Johnson, the Court instructed trial courts to avoid 
jury instructions with language comparing the reasonable doubt 
standard with a juror's personal standard in deciding the 
"weighty affairs" of his or her life. Xfi- Such language 
"tends to diminish and trivialize the constitutionally required 
burden-of-proof." Id. (quoting Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 
(Stewart, J., dissenting)). "A jury must have a greater 
assurance of the correctness of its decision, if it is to 
comply with the constitutional mandate/ than the individual 
jurors are likely to have in making the 'weighty* decisions 
they confront in their own lives." Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Defendant particularly objects to the inclusion of the 
following sentence: "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously 
upon it and obviates all reasonable doubt." Defendant claims 
that this sentence is contextually similar to a phrase rejected 
by Justice Stewart in his dissent in Ireland, where the 
instruction stated that the jury should convict if it had "an 
abiding conviction of the truth of the charge . . . ." Id. 
The first portion of the challenged sentence mirrors language 
approved in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 572-73 (Utah 1987), 
while the remainder of the sentence responds to Justice 
Stewart's criticism in Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1382 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting), and Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1148 (Stewart, J., 
concurring in the result), by incorporating the "need [to] 
obviate a real or substantial doubt" phrase expressed in 
Johnson. 774 P.2d at 1149 (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
result). 
Defendant dissects other portions of Instruction Number 
Seven in the course of arguing that the instruction did not 
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adequately define the reasonable doubt standard. However, 
several sentences now challenged by defendant are identical to 
sentences included in the very language of defendant's proposed 
instruction. Others are identical or textually similar to 
language approved by the Utah Supreme Court in Tillman, 
Johnson, and Ireland. We repeat that it is not the province of 
an appellate court to peruse each turn of phrase and every 
clause of a jury instruction. Rather, in search of prejudicial 
error, we consider the instruction in its entirety. Johnson, 
774 P.2d at 1146. 
The Supreme Court's rejection of the "weighty affairs" 
language reflects a concern that analogous language might 
permit a defendant to be convicted on a standard of proof lower 
than that which is constitutionally required. Johnson, 774 
P.2d at 1148 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). In 
essence, Johnson requires trial courts to avoid terms and 
phrases which fail to eliminate suggestions that a reasonable 
doubt is something more than a "mere possible doubt," although 
the Court did not prescribe particular language. See id. at 
1148-49. 
We have recently held that a reasonable doubt instruction 
identical to the instruction challenged in the present case 
satisfied the Johnson mandate. See State v. Pedersen, 150 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 10, 12-13 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . lWhile we recognize 
that this reasonable doubt instruction is not a model of 
lucidity and simplicity,3 it does present an "accurate 
2. Defendant cites the recent decision in Cage v. Louisiana, 
111 S.Ct. 328 (1990), claiming the reasonable doubt instruction 
condemned by the Court is sufficiently similar to the 
instruction now under review to merit reversal. We disagree. 
The Cage Court focused on phrases equating reasonable doubt 
with "grave uncertainty" and "actual substantial doubt" and 
seemed most troubled by a sentence stating that "moral 
certainty" was required rather than something greater. III. at 
329. We find no parallel language in Instruction Number Seven. 
3. "Beyond a reasonable doubt" is a concept not readily 
capable of being imparted to a lay jury. Indeed, during our 
recent spate of reasonable doubt cases, the position advanced 
by appellants has often seemed like an argument that we should 
require the substitution of one set of circular legal 
mumbo-jumbo for another. This is perhaps one area where a 
"plain English" approach may be more helpful to the jury than 
definition of the burden-of-proof placed upon the state."4 I£. 
at 13.5 
(Footnote 3 continued) 
intoning grand concepts. It may be more helpful to explain the 
burden-of-proof continuum, on the far extreme of which is proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. To explain that on a certainty 
scale of 0-100, proof by a preponderance of the evidence rates 
a 51, clear and convincing about a 70, and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt something like a 99 may help a jury to flesh 
out just how certain of guilt they must be to convict a 
criminal defendant. 
The familiar point that a reasonable doubt is a doubt 
which has a basis in reason or logic might be developed. It 
may be appropriate to suggest that if the jury has no doubt 
whatever about defendant's guilt, it must convict. If the 
jurors sense some doubt, they must consider its origin. If the 
doubt exists because they do not believe the only eyewitness to 
the crime could have seen the culprit in the darkness of the 
night from the distance acknowledged, they have a reasonable 
doubt about defendant's guilt and must acquit unless other 
evidence resolves that doubt and satisfies them of his or her 
guilt. If their only doubt stems from some amorphous or purely 
emotional urge—something like "there's just a feeling I get 
when the defendant looks at his mother that makes it hard for 
me to imagine he would do such a thing"—then the doubt they 
sense, while perceptible, is not a reasonable doubt and they 
must convict. ££. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1149 (Stewart, J., 
concurring in the result) ("Certainly a fanciful or wholly 
speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt."). 
4. "Omit needless words! Omit needless words! Omit needless 
words!" The late emperor of modern grammatical style, 
Professor William Strunk, Jr. of Cornell University, so began 
each lecture on brevity and clarity. W. Strunk & E.B. White, 
The Elements of Style, xiii (3rd ed. 1979). Many American 
courts fashioning jury instructions echo his call, see, e.g.. 
People v. Smith. 77 111. App. 3d 666, 396 N.E.2d 638, 642 
(1979); State v. Pioletti, 246 Kan. 49, 785 P.2d 963, 970 
(1990); State v. McKensie, 177 Mont. 280, 581 P.2d 1205, 1219 
(1978), vacated on other grounds. 443 U.S. 903 (1979); 
Commonwealth v. Sherlock, 326 Pa. Super. 103, 473 A.2d 629, 631 
(1984), a group which we unhesitatingly join even though our 
own opinions may occasionally suggest a different attitude. 
5. Attempting to capitalize on the Johnson and Ireland 
opinions, defendant in this case proposed a reasonable doubt 
o n n m i _r^ A fi 
PROSECUTORIAL MISSTATEMENT 
Defendant claims the prosecutor misstated the 
law regarding the affirmative defense of intoxication 
during his closing argument. The prosecutor stated: 
The state suggests that you may find . . . 
[defendant] guilty each of three ways, but 
any of the three ways is sufficient to 
find him guilty. When you read the 
instructions, you will note that 
voluntary intoxication, Instruction 20, 
does not apply at all to the third way 
[,]depraved indifference[,] that the 
government suggests that [defendant] may 
be found guilty. Doesn't matter how drunk 
he was. Doesn't matter how drunk people 
were that he shot. 
The "third way" of showing defendant's guilt required proof 
that defendant knowingly did an act with depraved indifference 
for life. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1)(c) (1990); State v. 
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 261 (Utah 1988). Thus, intoxication 
may be a defense if defendant's intoxication defeated his 
capacity to form the requisite intent. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-306 (1990); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). The state concedes that the 
prosecutor did indeed misrepresent the law to the jury, but 
counters that the error was immediately cured by the judge's 
prompt reference to the instructions. Defendant responds that 
the instructions themselves were confusing and misleading to 
the jury, so that the court's redirection of the jury's 
attention to the instructions did not cure the prosecutor's 
misstatement. 
(Footnote 5 continued) 
instruction which would have expressly negated the "weighty 
affairs" language. It is doubtful that an effort to define the 
reasonable doubt standard by telling the jury what it is not 
would be illuminating. In any event, the court rejected 
defendant's proffered instruction in favor of Instruction 
Number Seven. We need not consider the acceptability of the 
instruction rejected by the court since we hold that 
Instruction Number Seven adequately comports with the Johnson 
criteria. See Pedersen, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13. 
We consider challenges to prosecutorial comments under a 
two step analysis. First, we determine whether the remarks 
directed jurors' attention to "matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in determining their verdict." State 
v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). We next 
consider the likelihood that the jury was influenced in its 
verdict by the comments. i£. The state agrees the 
prosecutor's statement mischaracterized the law regarding 
voluntary intoxication as a defense to the element of the 
requisite mental state. Hence, the first prong of the test is 
satisfied. 
Although the trial judge failed to expressly rule on 
whether the prosecutor misstated the law, the judge called the 
attention of the jury to the written instructions which 
addressed the burden of persuasion for an affirmative defense. 
The court's response to defense counsel's objection did not 
directly contradict the prosecutor or correct his misstatement, 
as may have been appropriate. ££. id. (court immediately 
corrected prosecutor's misstatement of the law in presence of 
the jury). However, implicit in the court's response to the 
objection was the assurance that the written instructions, not 
the prosecutor's comments, accurately stated the law and should 
be the jury's sole referent in considering the affirmative 
defense of intoxication. Therefore, our analysis of the second 
Lopez prong necessarily reaches the substantive language of the 
allegedly curative instructions. 
The law of voluntary intoxication as an affirmative 
defense was explained in two instructions. Instruction Number 
Twenty stated: 
Voluntary intoxication is not a 
defense to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication negates the existence of the 
mental state which is an element of the 
offense; however, if recklessness or 
criminal negligence establishes an element 
of the offense and the actor is unaware of 
the risk because of voluntary 
intoxication, his unawareness is not a 
defense. 
Instruction Number Twenty-One provided: 
You are instructed that the laws of 
Utah do not require a defendant to 
a 
establish intoxication by a preponderance 
or greater weight of the evidence. The 
laws of Utah require the defendant to 
bring forward some substantial evidence 
which tends to show intoxication. If the 
defendant has done this, and if such 
evidence of intoxication when considered 
with all other evidence in this case 
raises a reasonable doubt as to whether or 
not the defendant was able to form the 
requisite mental state, then you must 
acquit him. 
In State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we 
stated "[a] defendant's burden concerning any affirmative 
defense is quite limited." Id- at 779. See State v. 
Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 691 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The 
burden remains on the state throughout the trial to prove each 
element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. At 
no point does any segment of that burden shift to the 
defendant. Tebbs, 786 P.2d at 779. Once the defendant raises 
an affirmative defense, supported by some evidence—whether 
introduced by defense or prosecution—the state must refute the 
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 
211, 215 (Utah 1985). We therefore agree with defendant that 
the portion of Instruction Number Twenty-One which "requires 
the defendant to bring forward some substantial evidence which 
tends to show intoxication" incorrectly states the law, both 
because the quantum of evidence required is not "substantial 
evidence" and because even the modicum of evidence necessary to 
trigger an affirmative defense may come from the prosecution's 
case and need not be brought forward by defendant. However, no 
prejudice resulted in this case since evidence of defendant's 
intoxication was more than*substantial and a good part of that 
evidence was indeed brought forward by defendant.6 Thus, while 
the instruction contemplated a greater evidentiary burden on 
6. The state called several witnesses who testified as to 
defendant's extraordinary alcohol consumption and his resulting 
demeanor. Defendant also testified as to his state of 
intoxication, although he need not have done so in order to 
assert an intoxication defense. But see Knoll, 712 P.2d at 215 
("defendant may have to assume the burden of producing some 
evidence . . . if there is no evidence in the prosecution's 
case that would provide some kind of evidentiary foundation" 
for an affirmative defense). 
defendant than the law requires to trigger an affirmative 
defense, that burden was met in this case. 
We do not agree with defendant that the misstatement in 
the instruction was of more far-reaching effect, i.e., that it 
impermissibly suggested that the burden of persuasion shifted 
to defendant to demonstrate that he was too intoxicated to 
formulate the requisite intent. We have noted above that we 
construe jury instructions as a whole. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 
1146. Language unambiguously stating that defendant need not 
prove intoxication by even a -preponderance or greater weight 
of the evidence" immediately preceded the contested language in 
Instruction Number Twenty-One. This instruction also stated 
that acquittal was required if there was a reasonable doubt 
about whether defendant's intoxication precluded formation of 
the requisite mental state. Instruction Number Twenty-One must 
also be read in conjunction with Instruction Number Seven, 
which advised that the state must prove all elements of the 
offense "beyond a reasonable doubt." We believe it unlikely 
that the jury understood that any burden of persuasion or proof 
had shifted by operation of this instruction. 
Our analysis of the second Lopez prong may also include 
consideration of the weight of the evidence against defendant. 
Lopez, 789 P.2d at 45-46. There was substantial evidence from 
which the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant's 
undisputed intoxication was not of such a degree as to vitiate 
the necessary mental state. Witnesses testified that 
defendant's skills in arithmetic remained intact—he coherently 
argued over the amount of beer remaining toward the end of the 
drinking party, and who had consumed more than his fair share. 
Defendant's own testimony indicated that prior to the shooting, 
while he was showing off his revolver, he carefully ensured 
that the gun was unloaded before passing it around the room* 
He demonstrated an extensive and detailed recall of the events 
precluding and surrounding the shooting. Defendant's actions 
immediately prior to the shooting, as related by eyewitnesses, 
further suggested a man in possession of coordination and 
control over his mental faculties. The motel manager testified 
that immediately after the shooting, defendant was "nonchalant" 
and calm as he attempted to leave the motel premises. 
When proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, we do not 
presume the challenged comments to be prejudicial. State v. 
Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). We find nothing in the 
record, and defendant has supplied no citation thereto, which 
convinces us of any reasonable likelihood that the jurors were 
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influenced by the prosecutor's remarks regarding the 
intoxication defense. We conclude that the second Lopez 
prong has not been satisfied and no reversible error resulted 
from the prosecutor's misstatement of the law. 
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
Instruction Number Eleven required the jury, in 
considering the attempted criminal homicide charge, to find 
that defendant "act[ed] under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life [and] engaged in conduct 
which created a grave risk of death to Leonard Tate . . . ." 
Defendant challenges the trial court's rejection of two 
explanatory sentences which he sought to add to Instruction 
Number Thirteen, which defined "depraved indifference." 
Defendant is entitled to instructions which provide 
jurors with a clear and meaningful statement of the applicable 
law. £&£ State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). 
However, the trial court enjoys the discretion to articulate 
the law in unadorned and intelligible terms, in order to assist 
the jury in its task of weighing the evidence on the scales of 
the law. State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988). 
The trial court in this case defined -depraved 
indifference" as follows: 
Depraved indifference refers not to 
mental subjective state but to the 
objective circumstances under which the 
conduct causing the injury occurred. 
Reckless conduct which has an incidental 
tragic result will not suffice. At the 
time of the act, the defendant must know 
of the risk. Knowledge here refers to the 
nature of the conduct or the circumstances 
7. We have noted that the trial court directed the jury to its 
instructions rather than the prosecutor's comments for the 
correct statement of applicable law. We further note that 
defendant did not object at trial to either instruction on 
intoxication now claimed to be misleading. Indeed, defendant 
does not refute the state's claim that Instruction Number 
Twenty-One was defendant's own instruction, offered precisely 
as defendant proposed it. 
surrounding it or both, but not the result 
produced by the conduct. The 
circumstances of the injury when 
objectively viewed must evidence a 
depraved indifference to human life. 
Defendant sought to add the following two sentences at the end 
of the instruction: 
In other words, there must be a knowing 
doing of an uncalled-for act in callous 
disregard of its likely harmful effect 
which is so heinous as to be equivalent to 
a "specific intent" to kill. ExampTes of 
this might be unmitigated wickedness, 
extreme inhumanity or acts of a high 
degree of wantonness. 
Defendant excerpted the omitted sentences principally 
from State v. Bolsinoer, 699 P.2d 1214, 1220 (Utah 1985), and 
asserts that similar language was more recently approved in 
Standiford. See 769 P.2d at 264. Defendant's proposed 
sentences are phrased illustratively, and merely seek to 
explain the law enunciated in the instruction as given. The 
first sentence simply rephrases the sentence "at the time of 
the act, the defendant must know of the risk," albeit in 
arguably more vibrant language. The second sentence is equally 
emotive, but superfluous. Defendant's basis for inclusion of 
this sentence is that identical terminology is found in dicta 
in Bolsinaer. See 699 P.2d at 1220. But defendant has no 
right to extract favorable rhetoric from any pleasing judicial 
dissertation and demand its inclusion in jury instructions.8 
8. In a sense, the last sentence proposed by defendant raises 
more questions than it answers and thus is not necessarily 
helpful in describing "depraved indifference." What is 
"wickedness" and when is it "unmitigated?" What is 
"inhumanity" and when is it "extreme?" What is "wantonness" 
and when has it reached a "high degree?" 
i ? 
In Standiford, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the 
depraved indifference requirement for a charge of second degree 
murder "focuses on the gravity of the risk to human life . . . 
and the callousness of attitude toward that risk." 769 P.2d at 
262. Standiford was ultimately directed at elucidating the 
distinction between a -grave" risk of death and a "substantial 
and unjustifiable" risk of death, the latter being the standard 
required for the lesser charge of manslaughter. The Court 
stated that a trial court must instruct the jury that the 
defendant knowingly created a risk of death which he or she 
knew to be a grave risk, meaning a highly likely probability of 
death, and that the defendant's conduct exhibited an "utter 
callousness and indifference toward human life." Standiford, 
769 P.2d at 264. The instructions given in the instant case, 
while not models of clarity and precision, adequately addressed 
those concerns. ££. id- at 264 ("gravity of the risk of death 
was not explained with quite the [required] precision . . . 
nevertheless . . . we do not believe the jury was misled"). 
Defendant's proffered supplementary language was surplusage, 
with at least some potential to confuse the jury, and the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing it. 
SENTENCING 
Defendant's sentence for the charge of attempted criminal 
homicide was enhanced for use of a firearm. Additional 
consecutive terms of one year and zero-to-five years were 
imposed. Defendant challenges the aggregate enhancement period 
as potentially exceeding the maximum term of five years. See 
State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The state 
agrees that defendant's sentence is improper on that basis. 
Accordingly, the firearms enhancement terms are vacated and the 
case is remanded for such resentencing as will alleviate this 
concern. 
Defendant also challenges the order of restitution, 
fines, surcharge, and attorney fees. The court is required to 
order restitution to crime victims if it finds that restitution 
is not inappropriate after analysis of certain statutory 
factors. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1990). While the court 
has the discretion to award or deny restitution, State v. 
Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1987), the judge must state the 
reasons for the decision in the trial record. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-201(3)(b)(i) (1990). Although the statute does not 
impose the requirement of full formal findings, a requirement 
which would perhaps simplify and expedite appellate review, the 
court must declare reasons within the statutory framework for 
awarding or denying restitution. A statement in the nature of 
findings which adequately apprises a reviewing court of the 
trial court's reasoning is minimally required. We are unable 
to determine from the record which, if any, of the factors 
enunciated in section 76-3-201(3)(b) were considered by the 
trial court. 
Imposition of a fine, and the accompanying mandatory 
surcharge, is a matter left to the discretion of the trial 
court. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-63a-l (1989), 76-3-301.5(5) 
(1990). No particular explanation needs to be made by the 
trial court. 
Costs, including reimbursement for legal defense fees, 
may be taxed to the defendant at the court's discretion. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-32a-l (1990). However, the court may not tax 
costs if the defendant is or will be unable to pay them. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-32a-3 (1990). Necessarily, the court must 
undertake an analysis of the defendant's ability to pay costs 
before ordering payment, and must consider the impact of 
restitution awards on the defendant's ability to pay. 1&. As 
with the matter of restitution, no formal findings are 
statutorily mandated, although appellate review becomes more 
complicated when the trial court fails to make formal findings, 
and becomes impossible when no insight into the court's 
rationale is discernible from the record. 
Because we have no record before us to demonstrate 
compliance with sections 76-3-201(3)(b) and 77-32a-3, we remand 
for supplementary findings on the questions of restitution and 
responsibility for attorney fees, together with such additional 
proceedings as may be necessary to permit the making of adequate 
findings. 
CONCLUSION 
The challenged jury instructions do not require reversal 
and defendant's conviction is affirmed. We vacate the firearms 
enhancement sentence and the award of restitution and costs and 
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remand to the trial court for resentencing and reconsideration 
of restitution and costs in accordance with our decision.^ 
<^%zs*(^ZL 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, ^'Judge 
9. We have considered defendant's other arguments and find 
them to be without merit and therefore decline to address them 
herein. See State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) 
("Court need not analyze and address in writing each and every 
argument, issue or claim raised . . . . " ) ; State v. Jones, 783 
P.2d 560, 565 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (court will not engage in 
"redundant literary exercise" to treat meritless issues). 
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Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Re: State v. Haston 
Case No. 900021-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Defendant/Appellant Robert T. Haston cites the 
following supplemental authority in support of his argument that 
"attempted depraved murder" is a legal impossibility. See 
Appellant Haston's opening brief at 26 n.9. 
State v. Vigil, Case No. 900166 (Appellant 
Vigil#s opening brief filed January 14, 1991) 
(interlocutory appeal questioning whether the 
charge of "attempted depraved indifference 
homicide" exists). 
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tonald S. Fui ir Ronald . j m o 
Attorney for A p p e l l a n t 
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